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ABSTRACT
The rising costs of prescription drugs are a growing concern for many Americans. The restraint
of trade for pharmaceutical drugs is a cause of rising costs for consumers, as companies seek to push
potential competitors out of the market to maintain profits. This unlawful restraint of trade will be
discussed in this comment. Specifically, this comment will focus on "Pay for Delay" agreements, mostly
between generic versus brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers. The proliferation of these
agreements only leads to an unsustainable market that discourages innovation and advancement, and
promotes fraud, as invalid patents are used as leverage to prevent generics from providing more
choices to consumers in a more competitive market. This comment will also address a regulatory
structure that can prevent parties from forming "Pay for Delay" agreements, while balancing between
respecting the rights of patent holders, protecting consumers, and promoting market competition.
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DELAYING COMPETITION: HOW SOUND PUBLIC POLICY AND RIGOROUS
ANTITRUST SCRUTINY CAN BE APPLIED TO CONTROVERSIAL PATENT
SETTLEMENTS

SAM HENSEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
How do we as a society want to handle the rising cost of prescription and over-the
counter pharmaceuticals? Should pharmaceutical drugs be a luxury only for those who
can afford it? The rising costs of prescription drugs are a growing concern for millions
of Americans. Perhaps no greater example of pain inflicted by high pharmaceutical
prices exists than the infamous case of Martin Shkreli, the former CEO of Turing
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 Shkreli, branded the “the most hated man in America,”
obtained an exclusive manufacturing license for Deraprim, which alleviates the effects
of HIV/AIDS.2 Skreli hiked the price of Deraprim from $13.50 to $750 per capsule.3
The restraint of trade for pharmaceutical drugs is a cause of rising costs for
consumers, as companies can restrain trade in a number of ways in order to maximize
profit potential.4 Such practices sometimes violate longstanding antitrust principles
in the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.5 The unlawful restraint of trade that is
largely the subject of this comment is called a “reverse payment” settlement
agreement, also known as a “Pay for Delay” agreement.6 According to the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), these deals alone cost consumers $3.5 billion annually.7 Pay
for delay agreements originate over disputes concerning whether a brand name drug
manufacturer holds a valid patent against generic drug manufacturers. 8 When the
parties settle, the brand name effectively pays the generic manufacturer a large sum
of money not to enter the market to sell its bioequivalent drug.9 The generic is thus
paid not to compete, and the lack of market competition sticks consumers with higher
prices as the brand rakes in larger profits.10

© Sam Hensel 2018.
Phil McCausland, Fraud Trial for Martin Shkreli, ‘Most Hated Man in America,’ Begins
Monday, NBC NEWS (Jun. 25, 2017, 8:14 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fraud-trialmartin-shkreli-most-hated-man-america-begins-monday-n-776581.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (endorsing Petitioner’s allegation in ¶ 45 of
Brief).
5 Id. at 2227.
6 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY FOR D ELAY (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/mergers-competition/pay-delay
7 Id.
8 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2223 – 2224.
9 Id. A generic drug is deemed “bioequivalent” if it contains the same active pharmaceutical
ingredient as the brand drug and has the same dosage and form. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2011), as amended by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007, Public Law 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (Sept. 27, 2007).
10 Id. at 1159.
*
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As courts have taken up enforcement, drug manufacturers are creating
increasingly complex settlement structures in an attempt to mask the anticompetitive
effects of their agreements.11 This comment makes the case for more aggressive
government action taken to protect the economic interests of ordinary Americans while
also respecting the intellectual property rights of putative patent holders. Legislative
and regulatory proposals are currently under review to ensure rigorous enforcement
by the FTC against pay for delay agreements and other unfair restraints of trade.12
Part I of this comment provides the necessary background on the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in FTC v. Actavis, the lower court’s
jurisprudence on post-Actavis lower-court jurisprudence, and relevant regulations and
legislation. Part II provides an in-depth analysis of the FTC and courts’ approaches to
pay for delay agreements. Part III examines current and potential legislative
proposals and whether it would be prudent for them to go a step further than the
courts’ holdings in prioritizing consumer welfare over abuses of patent rights. Part III
provides a proposal to remedy the legal problems found in antitrust enforcement
against pay for delay agreements in a way that recognizes the interests of consumers
as a priority.
II. BACKGROUND
The relevant history of pay for delay agreements begins with the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Reform Act of 1984, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act
(“Hatch-Waxman”).13 Hatch-Waxman created procedures for resolving patent disputes
between brand and generic manufactures.14 When a generic seeks approval for a drug
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), they must assure them that their
product will not infringe a patent.15 A generic may grant the FDA this assurance by
claiming that the existing patent is invalid, thus obviating any potential for
infringement through the drug’s manufacture, use, or sale.16
Of course, this option (known as a ‘Paragraph IV’) frequently provokes litigation
by the patentee.17 Brands file infringement claims against the generic to quiet title to
their patent.18 Should the brand bring an infringement suit within 45 days of the
11 Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements After Actavis: Three
Questions and Proposed Answers, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 25, 2017, 10:15 PM)
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/10/antitrust-analysis-reverse-payment-settlementsafter-actavis-three.
12 PRESERVE ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE GENERICS ACT, S. 124, 115th Cong. (2017).
13 While Paragraph IV-inspired settlements did not exist prior to Hatch-Waxman, the Supreme
Court held as early as 1931 that the settlement of patent litigation does not by itself violate antitrust.
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).
14 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2224.
15 Id.
16 Id. This option is in fact only one of four ways to obtain approval. A generic ANDA may also
(1) assert that no patent for the drug is in existence, (2) the existing patent has expired, or (3) the
patent will expire in a time frame that will not infringe upon the patentee’s rights upon the FDA’s
approval of the drug.
17 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (“It shall be an act of infringement to submit an application . . . for
a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent.”).
18 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2224.
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Paragraph IV filing, the FDA is required to delay their approval of the generic drug
for 30 months while the litigation is resolved.19 If the courts adjudicate the validity of
the patent, the FDA honors that ruling. But if the 30-month period expires without
determining the patent’s validity, the FDA may grant approval to the generic in
question.20
Pursuant to Hatch-Waxman, the first manufacturer to file its application is
entitled to a 180-day exclusivity period where no other generic can compete with the
brand, thus providing generic manufacturers with a large incentive to be first in line.21
In fact, the Generic Pharmaceutical Association indicated in 2006 that a majority of
their potential profits are derived from the sale of generic drugs during this 180-day
exclusivity period.22
Of course, some patent infringement disputes between brand and generic
manufacturers are resolved by settlements. Enter the “reverse payment settlement
agreement.” In his opinion in Actavis, Justice Breyer provides an illustration of such
a payment as follows:
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two
companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed
infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term
expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of
dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the
alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of
settlement agreement is often called a ‘reverse payment’ settlement
agreement.23
As Breyer explained, a settlement agreement that has the power to reduce
competition in the market can violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.24 FTC v. Actavis
involved a brand name manufacturer named Solvay Pharmaceuticals that successfully

Id.
Id.
21 Id. at 2224 – 2225.
22 Id. at 2225.
23 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2223.
24 Id. Approved by Congress in 1890, the Sherman Act responded to populist anger over large
companies engaging in a variety of practices, often involving product and service monopolization, that
left consumers paying high prices for goods and services while companies raked in record profits. See
also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
§ 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.” § 2 of the Sherman Act
makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations.” The Sherman Act’s goal is “not to protect businesses from the working of the market;
it is to protect the public from the failure of the market.” The Supreme Court has held that antitrust
scrutiny under the Sherman Act should be conducted to view the practical, anticompetitive effects of
the scheme in question rather than the form. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 191 – 92
(2010).
Since the Sherman Act’s passage, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) have divided and coordinated responsibility for federal enforcement against
anticompetitive practices in commerce.
19
20
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filed a New Drug Application (NDA) for their product, AndroGel.25 Later that year, a
generic manufacturer named Actavis, Inc.26 filed a Paragraph IV application for their
generic equivalent to AndroGel.27 Solvay commenced patent infringement litigation
against Actavis.28 More than 30 months passed and the FDA approved Actavis’
application, thus granting it its 180-day exclusivity period guaranteed under HatchWaxman.29 However, the parties reached a settlement before the court could reach a
judgment on the validity of the patent.30
According to the settlement, Actavis and the other generic applicants party to the
litigation would refrain from entering its generic product for another 9 years. In
exchange, Solvay agreed to pay $19 to $30 million annually to Actavis over the 9-year
period, and an additional $72 million to the remaining generic applicants who would
be entitled to enter the market following Actavis’s 180-day exclusivity period.31 The
FTC brought action against the settling parties, alleging that respondents violated 15
U.S.C. § 45 by engaging in monopoly profit-sharing at the expense of market
competition for a 9-year period.32
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court in favor of the defendants.
“Absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent,” the Court wrote, “a reverse
payment settlement agreement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent.”33 The Supreme Court reversed.34 Noting ample precedent for finding
Sherman Act violations in patent law, the Court held that pay for delay can violate the
Sherman Act and are thus subject to scrutiny under the “Rule of Reason” analysis.35
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013).
Then d/b/a Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
27 See generally Actavis, 133 S. Ct.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Actavis, 133 S. Ct.
32 Id. at 2226 (§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is brought by the FTC against defendants
who commit practices that violate the Sherman Act.).
33 Id. at 1158; See also Joblove v. Barr Labs, Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466
F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We generally agree, then, with the Eleventh Circuit . . . that simply
because a brand name pharmaceutical company holding a patent paid its generic competitor money
cannot be the sole basis for a violation of antitrust law, unless the exclusionary effects of the
agreement exceed the scope of the patent’s protection.”).
34 Actavis, at 2223. The Supreme Court held for the FTC by a 5-3 vote. Justice Roberts dissented,
joined by Justices Thomas and Scalia. Justice Alito did not participate in this decision. Id.
35 Id. at 2225. Justice Breyer concerns for why pay for delay agreements should subject to
antitrust scrutiny even if they are not per se Sherman Act violations included, among others, that (1)
Anticompetitive effects of pay for delay agreements are at least sometimes unjustified. Some
agreements cover attorney and litigation expenses, but others have adverse effects on market
competition. The burden of proof is on antitrust defendants to demonstrate that legitimate needs
justify their agreement under the “Rule of Reason” test. (2) Antitrust action is more feasible than
Chief Justice Roberts believed in his dissent. A pay for delay agreement implies that the patentee
has reason to doubt its patent’s validity. Otherwise, brand manufacturers would have less incentive
to settle a case they should otherwise win and pay generic would-be competitors not to enter the
market.
Under the Rule of Reason test, the plaintiff must prove that the agreement has an actual
harmful effect on market competition. The plaintiff may do this by weighing all the circumstances of
the case. A reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in quality of goods and services are
25
26
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The Court explained in dicta that the likelihood of a pay for delay agreement
violating antitrust law depends on its “size, scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated
future litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might
represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.”36 However, the
Court offered threadbare insight into how antitrust litigation under the “Rule of
Reason” approach should be structured to determine whether a reverse payment is
unlawful, leaving it to the lower courts to determine.37 Justice Roberts dissented, in
large part echoing the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in their application of the
“scope of the patent” test. Roberts emphasized the property rights of the patentee over
the exigencies of antitrust enforcement.38
In 2015, the Third Circuit held that pay for delay agreements can be found to
violate the Sherman Act by virtue of the anticompetitive effects they have on the
market.39 In King Drug, the parties’ settlement contained a “No-AG [Authorized
Generic]” agreement where the generic induced the brand not to market a generic
bioequivalent.40 Despite the lack of a cash payment as seen in Actavis, the Third
Circuit found the No-AG agreement to be an impermissible violation of antitrust law
due to its anticompetitive effects.41

all relevant factors in offering proof. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 – 69 (3d Cir. 1993).
The burden then shifts to the defendants, who must show that the agreement serves a legitimate
business purpose that outweighs anticompetitive effects. If successful, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to argue that the legitimate ends of the agreement could have been accomplished through
less restrictive alternatives. Addamax v. Open Software Found, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 274, 279 (D. Mass.
1995).
36 Id.
37 Id. The FTC urged the Supreme Court to adopt the “Quick-Look” analysis. “Quick-look” stands
for the proposition that a reverse payment settlement agreement is presumptively unlawful. In Cal.
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 775 (1999), the Court held that the burden rests on the defendants
to demonstrate precompetitive effects of their settlement, and that “Quick-Look” is appropriate only
where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets . . . quicklook analysis carries the day when the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can be easily
ascertained.” Id. at 770.
38 Id. at 1159 – 60.
39 King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 403 – 04 (3d Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 446, 196 L.Ed. 2d 328 (2016). The Third Circuit held the proceedings in
abeyance while waiting for the outcome of the Actavis decision before their holding with respect to
whether “no-AG” agreements should be similarly scrutinized. Id. at 399.
40 Id. at 397.
41 Id. at 405. See also Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Co. (In Re Loestrin
24 Fe Antitrust Litig.), 814 F.3d 538 (1d Cir. 2016) (holding that a non-cash pay for delay agreement
has anticompetitive effects).
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In In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, the Third Circuit held plaintiffs challenging
a pay for delay agreement are not required to plead a standard higher than what is
required by Twombly and Iqbal.42,43
42 In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15825 (2017). This case was in fact a
consolidated appeal concerning Pfizer’s Lipitor product and Wyeth, Inc.’s antidepressant, Effexor XR.
Teva became the first generic filer and gained its 180-day exclusivity period. Wyeth then filed a patent
infringement claim against Teva.
The parties settled, with Teva agreeing to delay entry of their generic drug until July 2010, or
seven years prior to the expiration of the patent, thus allowing Wyeth a monopoly over a market worth
approximately $500 million. Wyeth agreed not to launch an AG to compete with Teva’s upon their
entry into the market. In exchange, Teva would have to pay Wyeth royalties as a portion of their
profit from their generic drug’s market entry.
The Effexor plaintiffs, a class of direct-purchasers and retailers, brought action alleging that
Wyeth’s patent was fraudulently obtained and that the patents are being enforced through sham
litigation, and that the pay for delay agreement between the two companies was an unlawful restraint
of trade. The Effexor plaintiffs alleged Wyeth settled because they knew they would lose because their
Effexor patent was fraudulent. Moreover, U.S. drug purchasers paid billions of dollars more than they
otherwise would have had to had market competition not been stifled by Wyeth and Teva’s settlement
agreement.
The Court first relied on its precedent in King Drug to hold that the parties had plausibly pled
an unlawful reverse payment agreement, thus obviating the plaintiffs’ need to provide more specific
economic calculations to lend further support to their allegations. The Court said that, like in King
Drug, the district court erred in holding the plaintiffs to a higher standard than what the standard
set forth by Twombly and Iqbal require.
The Effexor plaintiffs alleged that the Wyeth/Teva No-AG agreement is unjustified because the
litigation costs between Wyeth and Teva, worth between $5-10 million, are a fraction of the $500
million payment Wyeth effectively made to Teva, and that Wyeth and Teva’s No-AG agreement lacks
precompetitive value.
The Effexor defendants argued in response that (1) the agreement is “traditional” in that it
provides for Teva paying royalties to Wyeth, (2) the complaints do not include allegations concerning
the royalty licensing agreements that make the settlement agreement lawful. The Court rejects these
arguments, pointing out that the lack of allegations concerning the appropriateness of the royalty
agreement does not run counter to the plausibility of an unlawful no-AG agreement. The Court left
open the possibility that the royalty agreements may provide a helpful defense for settling defendants,
but royalty agreements do not discount the sufficiency with which the plaintiffs made plausible claims.
The Effexor defendants contended that the submission of the contents of their settlement
agreement to the FTC nullified antitrust scrutiny. They argued that (1) by submitting the agreement
to the FTC, Wyeth lacked anticompetitive intent, (2) While not dispositive, the lack of anticompetitive
intent is an important factor in determining whether a pay for delay agreement should be viewed as
unlawful, and (3) the FTC’s failure to object, saying only that it reserves the right to object later,
effectively sanctioned the settlement agreement.
The Third Circuit found these arguments unconvincing, stating that unlawful agreements are
not immune from scrutiny simply because they were submitted to a regulatory agency for review.
Defendants’ submission of the settlement agreement infers only that they complied with the
consent decree and does not speak to the question of whether or not the parties harbored antitrust
intent. Furthermore, intent has never been an element of an antitrust claim and does not shield
anticompetitive conduct from liability.
The Third Circuit also rejected the argument that the FTC’s inaction implied that the settlement
agreement was permissible. As the Court pointed out, a number of factors may determine whether a
regulatory agency takes action, including an assessment of whether a violation occurred, the prudent
allocation of resources, or decisions made to perhaps only prosecute the largest or the most egregious
cases. Thus, the Court said, no consideration should be granted to the silence or inaction of the FTC,
particularly when the FTC stated explicitly that they reserve the right to take later action on the
agreement at any time permitted by law.
43 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 548 U.S. 903 (2006); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 554 U.S. 902 (2008).
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Emboldened in the years since Actavis, lawmakers and regulators have taken
action to reduce the harm pay for delay agreements inflict on consumers and
taxpayers. The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, introduced by Senator Amy
Klobuchar would, inter alia, (1) authorize the FTC to initiate antitrust proceedings in
regards to any agreement between parties with respect to a pharmaceutical patent
infringement claim, (2) declare pay for delay agreements presumptively unlawful
instead of using the Rule of Reason analysis, (3) create definitive exceptions for when
it is permissible for a patentee to delay the entry of market competition, (4) eliminate
the 180-day exclusivity period for generics if the pay for delay agreement is found
unlawful, (5) grant the FTC exclusive authority to litigate against anticompetitive
practices relating to pay for delay agreements, and (6) create a 6-year statute of
limitations for enforcement.44
In early 2017, Democratic Congressional leadership unveiled “A Better Deal”
policy platform that emphasized cracking down on monopolies, mergers, and other
abuses of economic power.45 The proposal called for a consumer competition advocate
that would provide research and recommendations for investigation to the FTC when
anticompetitive activity is found. The policy proposal made specific references to
regulating anticompetitive behavior by several industries, though it made no express
mention of the pharmaceutical industry.46
III. ANALYSIS
The “scope of the patent” test employed by Justice Roberts in his Actavis dissent
would likely do the least to alleviate financial stress brought upon consumers by pay
for delay agreements. The “scope of the patent” test makes exceptions only for sham
litigation settlements and when the patent giving rise to the dispute was obtained
fraudulently.47 While the “scope of the patent” test emphasizes the value of exclusive
property rights held by patentees over the objectives antitrust law works to satisfy, its
structure accomplishes neither.
The undervalued benefit of Actavis, its lower court progeny, and the legislative
and regulatory proposals discussed supra, is their assistance in determining by way of
litigation whether patents being challenged under Paragraph IV are invalid and/or
fraudulent.48 Opportunities for courts to determine validity or fraud are foreclosed by
pay for delay settlements because the courts are denied the opportunity to adjudicate
the issue.49

S. 124, 115th Cong. (2017).
A Better Deal, Press Release, Office of Representative Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader,
(July 22, 2017).
46 Id.
47 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2239 (2013).
48 Id. at 2234. (“The [Eleventh] Circuit’s related underlying concern consists of its fear that
antitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment settlement agreement would require the parties to litigate the
validity of the patent in order to demonstrate what would have happened to competition in the absence
of the settlement.”).
49 Id. at 2236. (“The [Eleventh] Circuit’s holding [in favor of the scope of the patent’ test] does
avoid the need to litigate the patent’s validity.”).
44
45
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The “scope of the patent” test has the potential to conceal invalid patents from
court scrutiny. Without determining the validity of the patent, manufacturers who no
longer hold (or may have never held) a valid claim to a patent can share monopoly
profits with a would-be competitor for a pharmaceutical product they may not actually
own. Subjecting pay for delay agreements to antitrust scrutiny will compel parties to
litigate over and decide patent validity. Encouraging and incentivizing manufacturers
to challenge patent validity promotes market competition and helps ensure that the
“Orange Book” is up to date and not riddled with outdated patents.50
Despite Justice Roberts’s concerns, patentees restrained from engaging in pay for
delay settlements still have exclusive property rights that are afforded by patent
ownership. Justice Roberts did not suggest that brand manufacturers may not still
market their product, refuse to license it, and turn a profit.51 As Justice Roberts points
out, the purpose of patents is to encourage innovation and to “exclude others from
profiting by the patented invention.”52 Pay for delay agreements do not prevent others
from profiting from the patent; in fact, they do just the opposite because the patentee
shares their profits with a would-be competitor. The practice of engaging in pay for
delay settlement agreements as a matter of right is not consistent with the purpose of
granting patents.
The Rule of Reason approach endorsed by Actavis has provided the FTC and
private plaintiffs with the tools necessary to make successful claims against
manufacturers engaging in pay for delay agreements.53 Indeed, the number of pay for
delay agreements has withered annually since the Actavis decision.54
The Rule of Reason appears sensible for giving each party its turn to present its
case in logical and methodical order. Under the Rule, courts hear of the anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement, the legitimate needs (if any) of the
defendants, and it allows them to make a determination as to whether those needs
outweigh the negative, anticompetitive effects of the agreement.55
The Rule of Reason’s flaw is its requirement that the plaintiff prove a prima facie
case before the burden shifts to the defendant to establish its defense.56 Under this
50 The Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, nicknamed the
“Orange Book,” contains the full list of approved New Drug Applications submitted by brand name
manufacturers. In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig., 848 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2017).
51 Actavis, at 2238.
52 Id. See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8. ([the Congress shall have the power] “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”).
53 See supra, n. 41.
54 Diane Bartz, Controversial ‘pay-for-delay’ deals drop after FTC’s win in top court, REUTERS
(Oct. 25, 2017, 2:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pharmaceuticals-patent-ftc/controversialpay-for-delay-deals-drop-after-ftcs-win-in-top-court-idUSKCN0UR2JA20160113; See also Bureau of
Competition, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-commissionunder-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/160113mmafy14rpt.pdf
(“The number of settlements potentially involving pay for delay decreased significantly in the
wake of the Actavis decision. For example, the number of potential pay-for-delay settlements in FY
2014 is roughly half the number in FY 2012, the last complete year before the Actavis decision”).
55 Addamax v. Open Software Found, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 274, 279 (D. Mass. 1995).
56 Id.
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regimen, defendants have had moderate success in deflecting antitrust claims against
them that perhaps should have moved forward in district court.57
The mission of the FTC to enforce antitrust law is obstructed by the burden placed
upon them by the Rule of Reason to prove a prima facie antitrust claim. Antitrust
defendants working under the Rule of Reason can get claims challenging pay for delay
agreements dismissed without having to prove to courts whether they have a
legitimate business interest. In contrast, the Quick Look approach places this burden
on the defendants more swiftly.58
The FTC and antitrust plaintiffs are more likely to win under the Quick Look
analysis, and reduce the number of pay for delay settlements. Under this analysis, the
issue the parties will dispute is whether the settlement has precompetitive effects, not
whether the settlement serves a legitimate business interest.59 Therefore, antitrust
defendants could have incentive under the Quick Look analysis to structure their
settlements in a way that both benefits their business interests while avoiding
anticompetitive harm to consumers.
While the Quick Look analysis helpfully shifts the burden to antitrust defendants
to prove precompetitive effects, it is limited by its capacity only to work to restrict
settlements that “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect
on customers and markets.”60
As drug manufacturers have adapted to the FTC’s campaign against pay for delay
agreements in the years following Actavis, manufacturers have structured agreements
with greater complexity beyond the scope of what the Quick Look analysis has
traditionally succeeded at curtailing.61 Thus, a broader and more encompassing
approach may be needed.
57 See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523 (2014).
(District Court dismissed
complaint for failing to meet pleading standard); King Drug (District Court dismissed for plaintiff’s
failure to assert existence of traditional pay for delay agreement). In In re Lamictal Purchaser
Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 282755 (D.N.J. 2014) and in In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp.
3d 180 (D.R.I. 2014), courts attempted to read Actavis more narrowly by finding that non-cash
payments do not apply.
58 See supra, n. 44.
59 Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National Basketball Ass’n., 961 F. 2d 667,
674 – 76 (7th Cir. 1992). (Quick Look analysis utilized after rejection of arguments trying to justify
agreement by pointing to precompetitive effects.)
60 See supra, n. 44.
61 Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements After Actavis: Three
Questions and Proposed Answers, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 25, 2017, 10:15 PM)
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/10/antitrust-analysis-reverse-payment-settlementsafter-actavis-three. (“Clever parties have an even stronger incentive to make their non-cash reverse
payments as complicated as possible.”)
For example, suppose a brand manufacturer holds Patents A and B. A generic files a Paragraph
IV claim for Patent A, but not Patent B. The brand claims infringement, and the parties’ settlement
involves the brand paying the manufacturer to stay out of the market for the contested patent for the
remainder of its life, but grants them a license to market the drug protected by Patent B. The
agreement is thus both precompetitive and anticompetitive.
Some would argue that Actavis and § 1 of the Sherman Act requires an analysis that holistically
considers the harms and benefits of the conduct in question. This analysis would allow a trier of fact
to reasonably find a defendants’ settlement to be lawful.
Another approach argues that the precompetitive benefits to consumers from the second patent
are irrelevant because the markets for the drugs are different. A patentee granting a license to market
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Senator Klobuchar’s S. 124 does much to correct the fragility in antitrust
enforcement against pay for delay agreements.62 First, S. 124 supplants the courts’
Rule of Reason approach in favor of a tough new standard. Instead of placing the
burden of stating a claim on the FTC or private plaintiffs, pay for delay agreements
are presumed to have anticompetitive effects and thus violate the Federal Trade
Commission Act.63 Settling parties can successfully fend off antitrust scrutiny only if
the precompetitive effects of their agreement outweigh the anticompetitive effects, or
if the settlement is limited in its coverage to ancillary expenditures (i.e. litigation
costs.) This standard provides the FTC with a powerful tool to crack down on pay for
delay agreements. S. 124 codifies King Drug’s holding that non-cash settlements are
still “payments” and would thus avert a split from the Third Circuit.64,65
S. 124’s requirement that settling parties submit their agreement to the FTC
within 30 days of its formation helps provide for timely review that respects both the
business interests of settling parties seeking quick clarity as to whether their
agreement is acceptable. However, S. 124 sets a six-year statute of limitations for the
FTC to bring an objection until antitrust claims are barred.66 The FTC may want to
use the generous amount of time afforded to file a claim observing whether the
settlement has precompetitive or anticompetitive effects.67

antidepressants, for example, does not resolve the anticompetitive effects of their pay for delay
agreement with a generic to lower cholesterol. Beyond this example, the demand for one drug is
always going to be lesser or greater than the demand for another drug.
Appellate courts have not determined whether a “give and take” type of settlement is permissible.
Analyzing such settlements with the Rule of Reason allows defendants to make a more compelling
argument that their legitimate business interests outweigh anticompetitive harm diminished by the
settlement’s structure. Courts deferential to business interests may be mollified by the settlements’
structure as antitrust concerns are alleviated.
62 S. 124, 115th Cong. (2017). (“Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act.”).
63 Former FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez supported this proposition in spite of Actavis because
it would enhance clarity, create a stronger deterrent effect, and help the FTC move more quickly to
stop pay for delay agreements. Pay for Delay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers,
Statement before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (July 23, 2013) (prepared statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n
presented
by
Chairwoman
Edith
Ramirez),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepred-statement-federal-tradecommission-pay-for-delay-deals-limiting-competition-and-costing/130723payfordelay.pdf.
64 King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 404 (3d Cir. 2015).
(“We believe this no-AG agreement falls under Actavis’s rule because it may represent an unusual,
unexplained reverse transfer of considerable value from the patentee to the alleged infringer and may
therefore give rise to the inference that it is a payment to eliminate the risk of competition.”).
65 S. 124, § 27. (“an agreement shall be presumed to have anticompetitive effects and shall be a
violation of this section if (i) an ANDA filer received anything of value, including an exclusive license”)
(Emphasis added).
66 S. 124, § 7.
(“The Federal Trade Commission shall commence any enforcement
proceeding . . . not later than 6 years after the date on which the parties to the agreement file the Note
of Agreement as provided by . . . 21 U.S.C. § 355.”).
67 Former Commissioner Joshua Wright’s analysis of the settlement structure that contains both
pro and anticompetitive effects comes to mind as an example of the FTC’s hypothetical approach to
confronting a relatively novel settlement structure, one that has pro and anticompetitive effects.
Wright suggested “the law, sound economics and common sense require us to balance.” Joshua D.
Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements After Actavis: Three Questions and
Proposed
Answers,
FEDERAL
TRADE
COMMISSION
(Sept.
25,
2017,
10:15
PM)
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S. 124’s provision allowing settling parties a right to appeal to federal courts is
reasonable. Settling parties may be reluctant to risk costs from futile litigation on top
of potential treble damages from the FTC’s findings. Power would be largely given to
the FTC, not courts, to determine whether settlements violate antitrust law.
S. 124 wisely incentivizes generic manufacturers to avoid engaging in pay for
delay agreements in favor of pursuing a resolution to the validity of the disputed
patent. This is because forfeiting a generic’s 180-day exclusivity period following the
expiration of the brand’s patent for engaging in a pay for delay agreement defeats the
generic manufacturer’s purpose in entering the settlement in the first place.
The 180-day exclusivity period accounts for the vast majority of generic drug
industry profits.68 A pay for delay settlement allows generic manufacturers to receive
the payments from brands until the expiration of the patent in addition to the 180-day
exclusivity period they are statutorily entitled to for being first to file an NDA.69 S.
124’s amendment may help deter generic manufacturers’ willingness to engage in pay
for delay settlements, compel answers to the validity of a challenged patent through
the courts, and still allow generic first-time filers to maintain their profitability.70
Lastly, S. 124 grants the FTC the exclusive authority to challenge pay for delay
agreements in court. This authority carries both risks and rewards. The FTC’s
mission is in part to promote market competition and combat anticompetitive
practices.71 They enjoy a wealth of talent, expertise, and experience, and is thus
arguably best equipped to detect anti-competition and challenge it when appropriate.72
However, the FTC could be potentially impeded by present and future White House
Administrations that do not prioritize its cause.73 An FTC unable to challenge pay for
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/10/antitrust-analysis-reverse-payment-settlementsafter-actavis-three.
GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS, United States Note, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise
Affairs, Competition Committee (June 2014). (“Finally, the FTC’s efforts . . . are not limited to
competition matters threatening immediate competitive harm”).
68 Actavis, at 2257 (quoting statement by Generic Pharmaceutical Association, Petr’s Br. at 6.)
69 Id. at 2246.
70 The proliferation of generic drugs into the market, leading to generic substitution, lowers
prescription drug costs for consumers. In fact, generic competitors entering the market for the first
time at a price that averages around 80% of the brand manufacturer’s bioequivalent. Subsequent
entry by competing generics have the potential to lower the market price even further, thus providing
consumers with even greater savings. FED. TRADE COMM’N, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term
Effects and Long-Term Impacts, Final Authorized Generic Report at 48 (Aug. 2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-long-term-impact-reportfederal-trade-commission. Consumers stand to save a lot from generic competition following patent
challenges that move forward. “Generic competition following successful patent challenges involving
just four major brand name drugs saved consumers an estimated $9 billion.”
GENERIC
PHARMACEUTICALS, supra n. 67.
71 FED. TRADE COMM’N, WHAT WE DO, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do.
72 FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSIONERS, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners; FED.
TRADE COMM’N, CAREERS, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/careers-ftc. (“We have over 1,000 staff, from
investigators, to attorneys, to specialists in information technology, public affairs, financial
management, public policy, and many other fields.”).
73 Currently, the five-member Commission only has two of five positions filled, by Acting
Chairwoman and Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen and Commissioner Terrell McSweeny, both
of whom have served in their positions since the Obama Administration. Max Greenwood, Trump to
nominate
DC
antitrust
attorney
to
lead
FTC:
Report,
THE
HILL,
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/356143-trump-to-nominate-dc-antitrust-attorney-to-lead-ftc-report.
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delay agreements would leave consumers without a remedy if the FTC declines to
fulfill its role when necessary. In King Drug and others, antitrust action was brought
by private plaintiffs.74 S. 124 would prevent them from doing so again.75
The “A Better Deal” policy proposals specifically mention requiring regulators to
take action antitrust necessary.76 In addition, there has been broad agreement among
Democratic and Republican Commissioners on the FTC for cracking down on pay for
delay agreements.77 The Commission has considered enforcement against pay for delay
agreements to be a top regulatory priority.78
The exclusive authority of the FTC to bring action against settling parties puts
the Commission’s policy experts in charge of the process. This is especially important
when settlement structures have both precompetitive and anticompetitive effects.
Private plaintiffs with only layman’s knowledge of the law, economics, and the
pharmaceutical industry could otherwise be successful in court at dismantling
agreements that FTC policy experts deem to overall be healthy for market competition
by promoting lower drug prices for consumers. Thus, granting exclusive authority to
the FTC to challenge pay for delay settlement agreements is more likely to lead to a
better outcome for consumers and their budgets.
Despite the proliferation of pay for delay agreements, the courts have moved in
the right direction since Actavis in limiting them.
IV. PROPOSAL
Actavis was narrowly decided by the Supreme Court by a 5-3 decision, with Justice
Alito taking no part in the decision.79 As the composition of the Court undergoes
The remaining three positions remained unfilled, though nominations have recently been filed and
are awaiting Senate confirmation. Id.
74 King Drug, 791 F.3d 388, at 393. (“Plaintiffs here, direct purchasers of the brand-name drug
Lamictal, sued Lamictal’s producer, SmithKline Beecham Corporation . . . and Teva Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd . . . a manufacturer of generic Lamictal, for violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act”).
75 S. 124, 115th Cong. (2017).
76 Press Release, Office of Representative Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader, A Better Deal,
(July 22, 2017).
The [consumer competition] advocate’s recommendations would be made public,
and the regulators would be required, if they choose not to pursue a recommended
investigation, to publicly justify why . . . Regulators would be . . . required to take
corrective measures if they find abusive monopolistic conditions where previously
approved measures fail to make good on their intended outcomes.
77 Antitrust Concerns and the FDA Approval Process: Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. 14 (2017) (prepared statement of Markus H. Meier, Acting Director, Bureau of Competition,
U.S. Federal Trade Commission); Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition
and the Department of Justice Division, Statement before the Subcomm. On Courts and Competition
Policy of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (July 27, 2010) (prepared statement of the Fed.
Trade
Comm’n
presented
by
Chairman
Jon
Leibowitz),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federaltrade-commission-oversight-federal-trade-commission-bureaucompetition/100727antitrustoversight.pdf. In addition, S. 124 is co-sponsored by Senator Charles
Grassley, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
78 Id. at 1.
79 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
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further changes, the potential for it to overturn Actavis and supplant its holding with
Justice Roberts’s “scope of the patent” test is arguably high. The dissolution of the
Actavis holding would further invalidate the lower courts’ jurisprudence stemming
from it.
In the years following Actavis, the courts have permitted the FTC to advocate
more effectively on behalf of consumers to ensure they pay no greater than market
value for pharmaceuticals.80 In order to protect the FTC’s progress in enforcing
antitrust law against pay for delay agreements, Congress must step forward to codify
the principles of Actavis, or even go steps further, as S. 124 does.
Many of S. 124’s provisions should be swiftly adopted.81 First, Congress should
abandon the “Rule of Reason” approach and declare pay for delay agreements to be
presumptively unlawful.82 This is the first and arguably one of the largest steps that
can be taken to help limit pay for delay. Congress should allow for the FTC to be the
sole entity responsible for bringing legal challenges to pay for delay agreements. The
FTC is better equipped to determine what will and will not harm consumers.83
If suits were permitted to be brought by private litigants after S. 124’s 6-year
deadline, they should be barred if the FTC determined that an agreement is procompetitive. Generic manufacturers found to have violated antitrust law by engaging
in pay for delay should, as S. 124 calls for, have their 180-day exclusivity period
forfeited.
This regulatory structure creates a multi-tiered defense that would prevent harm
to consumers. First, generic manufacturers would be deterred from agreeing with
brand manufacturers who offer to pay them to stay out of the market. At least some
generic manufacturers would decide it unworthy to risk receiving attention from the
80 Diane Bartz, Controversial ‘pay-for-delay’ deals drop after FTC’s win in top court, REUTERS
(Oct. 25, 2017, 2:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pharmaceuticals-patent-ftc/controversialpay-for-delay-deals-drop-after-ftcs-win-in-top-court-idUSKCN0UR2JA20160113; See also Bureau of
Competition, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-commissionunder-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/160113mmafy14rpt.pdf.
(“The
number
of
settlements potentially involving pay for delay decreased significantly in the wake of the Actavis
decision. For example, the number of potential pay-for-delay settlements in FY 2014 is roughly half
the number in FY 2012, the last complete year before the Actavis decision”).
81 S. 124, 115th Cong. (2017).
82 Id.
Subject to subparagraph (B), in such a proceeding, an agreement shall be presumed
to have anticompetitive effects and shall be a violation of this section if – (i) an
ANDA filer receives anything of value, including an exclusive lincense; and (ii) the
ANDA filer agrees to limit or forego research, development, manufacturing,
marketing, or sales of the ANDA product for any period of time.
83 GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS, United States Note, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise
Affairs, Competition Committee, (June 2014).
the FTC’s efforts in the generic pharmaceutical sector are not limited only to
competition matters threatening immediate competitive harm. The FTC monitors
developments in the pharmaceutical sector to inform both current and future
enforcement and advocacy. New business models, technological innovations, and
new or modified laws and regulations may affect pharmaceutical competition. The
FTC responds to these changes through research, policy recommendations and
advocacy, and, when appropriate, enforcement actions to ensure that consumers
benefit from these changes.
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FTC. The arguably more profitable path for them would be to reject reverse payment
settlement offers and stand by their Paragraph IV declaration. The litigation’s
resolution would clarify the disputed patent’s validity and if the generic is successful,
it is entitled to 180 days of generic market exclusivity.84 Consumers would be
unharmed by this process, and the intellectual property rights of the owner of a valid
patent would be protected.
Manufacturers willing to take the risk are more likely to lose under S. 124’s
standard than through the Rule of Reason. The FTC’s expertise, zealous motivation,
and deference granted by the courts would make pay for delay agreements unlikely to
survive, unless manufacturers are able to convince them that their agreement provides
a justified, net positive to market competition that benefits consumers. However, the
FTC may want to consider that even a net positive may be insufficient, if a settlement
agreement too severely hurts competition in one market even though it greatly benefits
competition in a different market. A comparison of marketplace demand for each
pharmaceutical taking part in the formula may be a helpful place to observe. Some
may ague that the similarities and differences of the types of pharmaceuticals involved
in the settlement should play a factor.85 Such determinations should be made by
experts at the FTC.
In addition to S. 124, Congress should require the FTC to require manufacturers
that lose in court to establish an account in escrow to compensate consumers who have
paid supracompetitive prices for pharmaceuticals. The amount to be paid should be,
at minimum, the difference between the profits made by selling at the price above
market value and the profit that would have been made from sales made at fair market
value.
The FTC has successfully obtained settlements from companies engaged in
anticompetitive activity on behalf of consumers before.86 Language should be inserted
84 In an infringement suit brought by a brand manufacturer against the generic, the generic has
had a success rate of 73%, indicating that Paragraph IV challenges are far more likely than not to
lead to market competition. Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, EXEC.
SUMMARY (July 2002) http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
85 Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements After Actavis: Three
Questions and Proposed Answers, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 25, 2017, 10:15 PM)
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/10/antitrust-analysis-reverse-payment-settlementsafter-actavis-three.
Another position might be to say that any consumer benefits that occur in the
market for Drug 2 should not count under the law because the markets for Drug 1
and Drug 2 are different, or are not sufficiently related, to render consumer benefits
from increased competition over Drug 2 cognizable under Section 1 [of the Sherman
Act.] I think the law, sound economics, and common sense require us to balance.
86 FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 433 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
Here, the FTC sought
“disgorgement” of a portion of Cephalon’s profits for the sale of their premier product Provigil, which
treats narcolepsy and other sleep disorders. Id. at 435. “Disgorgement” is an equitable remedy meant
to prevent unjust enrichment. Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 725 F. 3d 406, 415 (3d Cir.
2013) (citing S.E.C. v. Huffman, 996 F. 2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993). Cephalon settled with generic
drug manufacturers who sought to market their bioequivalent versions of Provigil by paying them
millions in exchange for their abstention from the market for 6 years. Cephalon, at 435. Following
Actavis in 2013, the FTC sought to look for “some redress of the consumer harm that’s been caused by
the years and years of delayed generic entry.” Id. at 436. The FTC then sought disgorgement of
Cephalon’s illegal profits pursuant to § 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which allows for
the plaintiff to seek necessary equitable relief to rectify injustice and avoid recurrence (higher prices
imposed upon consumers by illegal restraint of competition). Id. at 435.

[17:655 2018] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

670

into § 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act specifying that disgorgement of funds
to recover economic losses on behalf of consumers is required when appropriate.87 The
language should allow for the FTC to seek disgorgement of profits at any point within
S. 124’s proposed 6-month statute of limitations.
As pay for delay agreements have the potential to not demonstrate
anticompetitive effect until late, the profits obtained from uncompetitive pay for delay
agreements could balloon by the end of the statutory period, indicating a great deal of
harm to consumers. Disgorgement of profits made from anticompetitive pricing will
cure financial injury to consumers struggling to afford their medication. The power to
return ill-gotten gains back to consumers can be seen as the final layer of the FTC’s
defense
on
behalf
of
consumers.
These proposed alterations and additions to S. 124 could potentially go a long way in
deterring the proliferation of pay for delay agreements, or in the alternative recovering
ill-gotten gains from consumers when manufacturers engage in anticompetitive
conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
Karen Winkler of Clarkston, Michigan has multiple sclerosis.88 Among MS’s
many symptoms is fatigue. She obtained a prescription from her doctor for Provilgil
to help her with her sleep schedule.89 The year she was diagnosed, Cephalon made a
profit of $475 million from the drug. In 2008, a 6-month supply of Provilgil cost her
$300. By 2010, it cost her $700.90 Around that time, her husband had to take a pay
cut, so they had to dip into savings and their retirement. “And with three young kids,”
she said, she “felt guilty that I was taking away from the family budget.”91
The consequences of relaxed antitrust law have real effects on every day people
and their families, like that of Mrs. Winkler’s.92 The inflated cost of drugs on
Cephalon sought to dismiss on grounds that (1) disgorgement is not encompassed within § 13(b)
of the Act, and (2) even if it was, it would not be permitted in their case to do so because it would not
be equitable. Id. at 436. The District Court held for the FTC and read disgorgement into § 13(b). Id.
at 439. As the Court noted, eight different Circuit Courts of Appeals have each reached the same
conclusion. Id.
Cephalon contended in the alternative that equitable remedies are not appropriate if
disgorgement is read into § 13(b) because the FTC did not invoke it in their prayer for relief. Id. at
439. The Court noted that the FTC’s prayer for relief included “such other equitable relief as the
Court finds necessary to redress and prevent recurrence of Cephalon’s violation of § 5(a) of the FTC
Act” before holding that their prayer was sufficient to ask the Court for disgorgement. Id.
87 See Cephalon, at 439; See also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2017).
88 Megan Thompson, Are Generic Drugs Being Delayed to Market?, PBS (Nov. 13, 2017, 10:26
PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/generic-drugs-delayed-market.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Wells Wilkinson, Delay of Generics Hurts Consumer and Taxpayer Wallets and Patient Health,
COMMUNITY CATALYST (Nov. 14, 2017, 9:06 AM), https://www.communitycatalyst.org/blog/delay-ofgenerics-hurts-consumer-and-taxpayer-wallets-and-patient-health#.Wg9YobT81ol.
Overall, these so-called settlements have caused consumers and their health plans
to pay tens of billions right into the pockets of the brand-name drug
companies . . . For the millions who are underinsured, delaying a generic can force
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consumers has the potential to take up more and more of the average household’s
budget until it is pushed past their breaking point.93
Pay for delay agreements allow generic manufacturers to obtain profits directly
from brand manufacturers who may not even hold a valid patent, instead of making a
profit by competing against them. The proliferation of these agreements can only lead
to a lethargic and unsustainable market that discourages innovation and advancement
and promotes fraud, as invalid patents could be constantly used as leverage to prevent
generics from providing potentially great alternative pharmaceuticals to consumers.
A regulatory structure that prevents parties from forming pay for delay
agreements respects the rights of valid patent holders, protects consumers, and
promotes market competition. This structure requires, among other things, a generic
manufacturer’s forfeiture of their 180-day exclusivity period upon a finding of antitrust
liability, a legal standard that presumes pay for delay agreements to be unlawful, a
compensatory fund for consumers forced to pay supracompetitive prices for
pharmaceuticals, and exclusive authority by the FTC to litigate. The Federal Trade
Commission’s campaign against pay for delay agreements must be facilitated, not
obstructed by the judiciary or by Congress. Lives depend on it.

patients to pay thousands of dollars a year, or go without needed medicine. One
story we collected from a consumer from Kansas describes his struggle to afford
Provigil, whose generic was delayed from 2006 to 2011 by pay for delay. He
reported: ‘[Despite] paying almost $17,000 in annual premiums for my family
[health insurance plan] last year, I was paying around $650/month [for
Provigil] . . . That is out of pocket money I have to come up with until later in the
year when I reach my deductible [sic] and I can enjoy a few months of only paying
$60/month. I cannot describe to you how much stress and difficulty this has caused
for me and my family the last several years.’
93Aimee Picchi, Prognosis for RX in 2017: more painful drug-price hikes, CBS (Nov. 13, 2017,
10:47 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drug-prices-to-rise-12-percent-in-2017/.

